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ABSTRACT 
 
Employment Effects of Privatisation and 
Foreign Acquisition of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises*
 
This paper investigates the effects of domestic privatisation or foreign acquisition of Chinese 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) on employment growth, using firm level data for China and 
a combination of propensity score matching and difference-in-differences in order to identify 
the causal effect. Our results suggest that, controlling for output growth there is some 
evidence that domestic privatisation leads to contemporaneous reductions in employment 
growth compared to firms that did not undergo an ownership change. By contrast, there is 
some evidence that foreign acquisitions show higher employment growth in the post 
acquisition period than non-acquired SOEs. 
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1 Introduction 
China has undergone dramatic economic changes since it started its opening-up 
and liberalisation programs in 1978, moving from being a centrally planned economy to a 
middle income, emerging market economy at the turn of the millennium. Indeed, the 
country is now a rapidly growing manufacturing base, exporting nation, and recent 
member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO); issues that have stirred much recent 
debate in the popular press as well as among academics. Economic reforms have had 
particular implications for Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOEs), boosting enormously 
total factor productivity (Li, 1997) largely by improving incentive for managers and 
workers (Groves et al., 1994, 1995) and decentralising economic decision-making (Cao et 
al. 1999, Lau et al. 2000).  
From being by far the dominant form of enterprise in pre-reform China, their 
importance has declined rapidly over the last two decades, both because of the emergence 
of the private sector, and the massive privatisation program launched at the end of the 
1990s which aimed at selling all but the largest 300 or so SOEs (Lin, 2000 and Megginson 
and Netter, 2001). Still, the welfare of tens of millions of urban workers, and the 
generation of adequate state revenues depend to a large extent on the success of SOEs.  
However, Lin et al. (1998), for example, argue that without state subsidies, protection and 
easy access to bank credits, the majority of SOEs would be on the verge of collapse.  
Hence, reforming SOEs in order to enable them to compete successfully on domestic and 
international markets is of utmost importance for sustained growth of the Chinese 
economy.   
One possible route through which SOEs may become more efficient and 
competitive is through privatisation (Lin et al., 1998).  This can be either a privatisation on 
the domestic market, i.e., the private owners being Chinese nationals, or through foreign 
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direct investment, with the Chinese firm being acquired (partly or fully) by foreign 
multinationals.  Both of these routes are considered in this paper.  We are particularly 
concerned with investigating the effects of domestic privatisation and foreign acquisition 
on employment growth in the Chinese firm.   
From a policy perspective this research question is motivated by two concerns.  On 
the one hand, privatisation or indeed any change of ownership may have implications for 
“safeguarding jobs” as workers may be set off in a move to reduce the labour force in an 
attempt to streamline production.  On the other hand, a possible reduction in the workforce 
may be necessary to improve efficiency and productivity in the SOEs.  Our specific 
research in this paper focuses more on the latter aspect.  We look at the efficiency effects 
of privatisation/acquisition by examining the effect on employment growth controlling for 
contemporaneous output growth.1   
The identification of the causal effect of ownership change on employment is 
hampered by a possible selection bias.  If SOEs that have certain characteristics which are 
correlated with employment growth (e.g., size or productivity) are more likely to be 
targets for domestic privatisation or foreign acquisition, then a comparison of post 
ownership change employment growth with that of a randomly selected control group is 
problematic and may lead to biased results. In this paper we address this issue through a 
combination of propensity score matching and difference-in-differences techniques.  
Firstly, we use propensity score matching (e.g., Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) to identify a 
control group of matched firms that are similar in characteristics to those firms that 
                                                 
1 An empirical investigation of the privatisation effects on employment levels in China is also particularly 
interesting because of the role played by SOEs. As noted in Megginson and Netter (2001), Chinese SOEs, 
rather than the government itself, serve as the country’s social safety net, thus in China SOEs are burdened 
with many social welfare responsibilities (Bai et al., 1997 and Lin et al., 1998). Since there were concerns, 
when the massive privatisation program was launched, that the government would not have granted 
privatised firms discretion over staffing levels or subjected them to truly enterprise-threatening competition 
(Megginson and Netter, 2001), it is interesting to investigate whether those concerns were ill founded a few 
years after the launch of the privatisation program.  
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experienced an ownership change. We then run a difference-in-differences econometric 
model on the matched sample of firms in order to identify the causal effect of ownership 
change on employment growth, controlling for other characteristics that are presumed to 
affect labour demand.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 discusses the related 
literature.  The data and econometric approach are presented in Section 3 while Section 4 
outlines the main empirical findings.  A summary and conclusion can be found in Section 
5.   
 
2 Literature Review 
Evaluating the effectiveness of privatisation programs in improving economic and 
financial performance of divested firms has received a great deal of attention in the 
literature. Theory is inconclusive about the merits of government vs. private ownership in 
promoting efficiency, as pointed out by Laffont and Tirole (1993). Basically, government 
intervention in the economy is required when there exists some form of market failure 
whereas privatisation is the response to state ownership failure. Welfare economics 
suggests that privatisation tends to reap the highest gains when SOEs operate in already 
competitive markets or markets that can readily become competitive, i.e. when the market 
failure problem is less severe. In contrast, the arguments for privatisation are weaker in 
markets for public goods and natural monopolies where competition is dwarfed. However 
even in the latter case, as discussed by Megginson and Netter (2001), private ownership is 
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generally considered more appropriate than the public one because, among other things, it 
is easier to have a well-defined and stable corporate goal under private ownership.2
Considering property rights and agency costs problems, the superior performance 
of privately-owned firms compared to state-owned ones arises since the former possess a 
broader range of monitoring devices. Moreover, SOEs may be more inefficient if they 
receive government funding or are bailed out by the state in case of insolvency, leading to 
soft budget constraints. This is typical of firms under communist regimes, where hard 
budget constraints are generally ineffective even when formally imposed.3 Of course the 
theory about privatisation does not argue that state intervention is bad per se, but that it is 
more harmful if pursued with state ownership than with state regulation. 
The empirical literature that has compared the performance of SOEs to privatised 
or private firms has principally investigated the effects of privatisation on measures of 
productive efficiency, productivity, profitability, cost reduction, factor intensity, corporate 
value, level of indebtness, investment and employment.  All empirical work in this area 
faces the problems of selection bias, endogeneity, omitted variables, lack of data or 
inadequate data, to a different extent.4 It is therefore important to have access to adequate 
data and use econometric techniques that allow controlling for these problems. Despite 
these concerns, many studies – as surveyed in Megginson and Netter (2001) – have 
managed to compare SOEs and private firms’ performance using different methodologies 
                                                 
2 For example, even if governments pursue a profit-maximising goal for the firm it is difficult to write 
complete contracts that tie managers’ incentives to that goal because of diffuse ownership (e.g., Shleifer, 
1998). 
3 See, for example, Kornai (1988, 1993) and Frydman et al. (2000). 
4 Selection bias is due to the possibility that best performing firms are selected for privatization. 
Endogeneity, as explained in Megginson and Netter (2001, p. 332) has to do with the “fundamental reasons 
why certain firms are government owned and others are privately owned, including the degree of perceived 
market failure within the particular industry. The factors […] also have significant effects on performance. 
Thus, it is difficult to evaluate the effects of government ownership where the ownership structure is itself 
endogenous to the system that includes both political and performance goals”. Arguably, in a centrally 
planned or transition economy this type of endogeneity is less of an issue as all industries were formerly 
state owned. 
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but reaching in the majority of cases similar results across countries, industries and 
periods of time. 
The most consistent result found is that performance differs between SOEs and 
privately held firms, with the latter showing significant higher productivity or efficiency 
and profitability, even after controlling for size, market share, technical changes and other 
market conditions.5 And this seems important when analysing non developed or 
developing countries.  
A word of caution must be said when examining the effects of privatisation carried 
out in any transition country: the difficulty in disentangling the effects of privatisation 
alone from the effects due to the contemporaneous deregulation and market liberalisation 
usually taking place at the same time as privatisation. Some argue that competition and 
regulation are more important than privatisation or governance changes in improving the 
performance of firms,6 while others are convinced that privatisation is necessary for 
significant performance improvements.7  For China, Groves et al (1994) and Li (1997) 
provide some evidence that enterprise restructuring through an improvement in the 
allocation of property rights and incentives can yield large benefits even without 
privatisation.  However, Shirley and Xu (1998) reach the opposite conclusion.8
                                                 
5 For example see Vining and Boardman (1992) and Ehrlich et al. (1994). 
6 See for example Bishop and Kay (1989), Vickers and Yarrow (1991) and Allen and Gale (1999). 
7 Among others, Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Nellis (1994), Brada (1996) and Shleifer (1998). 
8 Unfortunately, as Megginson and Netter (2001) note, it is very difficult to obtain evidence on whether 
economic reform coupled with privatisation could lead to even bigger performance improvements. A study 
that considers both the effects of competition and privatisation is Ros (1999) for main telecoms in 110 
countries and finds that both reforms increase efficiency but only privatisation increases network expansion. 
Boyland and Nicoletti (2000) also investigate the contemporaneous effects of privatisation and liberalisation 
on cellular telephone services in 23 OECD countries and find that whilst competition does increase 
productivity and lowers prices, privatisation has no clear effects. Wallsten (2001) explores the effects of 
privatisation, competition and regulation on telecommunication performance in 30 African and Latin 
American countries and concludes that increasing competition is the single best reform; competition in 
combination with privatisation is the best, while privatising a monopoly without regulatory reforms is to be 
avoided. Notice that all these three studies are about telecommunication industries, no evidence is available 
which is broader in scope. 
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Concerning in particular the empirical literature on the employment effects of 
privatisation, the results are less unanimous than for productivity or profitability. Studies 
that document decreases, sometimes quite substantial, in employment levels following 
privatisation are, for example, Ramamurti (1997) using data for the national Argentinean 
railroad Ferrocarilla Argentinos; La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) for 218 Mexican 
SOEs; D’Souza and Megginson (1999) for 78 firms from both developed and developing 
countries; Boardman, Laurin and Vining (2002) for 9 Canadian firms; and Harper (2002) 
for 174 Czech firms in a first wave, and 380 in a second wave of privatisations.  By 
contrast, studies that found no significant change in employment after privatisation 
include Macqueira and Zurita (1996) for 22 Chilean firms; D’Souza and Megginson 
(2000) for 17 national telecom companies.  Furthermore, three studies document an 
increase in employment: Galal et al. (1994); Megginson, Nash and van Randenborgh 
(1994) for 61 firms from 18 countries; Boubakri and Cosset (1998) for 79 firms from 21 
developing countries.  As pointed out in Megginson and Netter (2001), these conflicting 
results could be partly explained by different methodologies, sample size or omitted 
factors. But they could also reflect genuine differences between countries and industries 
analysed, meaning that no standard outcome is expected in terms of employment changes 
in privatised firms. 
However, one issue that has not received much investigation in the literature is 
whether the sale of divested firms to domestic vs. foreign buyers can have different effects 
on the subsequent performance of such privatised firms.  Among the few studies that 
analyse the impact of domestic vs. foreign ownership on performance are Smith, Cin and 
Vodopivec (1997), Dyck (1997), Djankov (1999) and Frydman et al. (1999) and they 
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document that foreign ownership is associated with greater post-privatisation performance 
improvement than is purely domestic ownership.9
To the best of our knowledge, however, only Frydman et al. (1999) analyse 
whether the foreign ownership of newly privatised firms in Poland, Hungary and Czech 
Republic may have a different impact on employment levels than domestic ownership. 
They find that foreign-owned privatised firms are ‘softer’ on employment reductions than 
domestic ones (controlling for revenue and productivity growth). Possible interpretations 
of this result suggested by the authors are that foreign owners can afford a longer-term 
perspective, that they are reluctant to lay off workers to avoid mistrust, or simply that they 
are prevented from doing it by explicit or implicit agreements in the purchase contracts.  
Given the interest for China in evaluating the employment evolutions in recent years for 
privatised SOEs we consider this a motivation for our study for distinguishing between 
domestic and foreign-led (through cross-border acquisition) privatisations.  
Moreover, in our study we pay particular attention to the selection problem. Only a 
few studies have attempted to control for selection, using different approaches. Some 
studies compare post-privatisation performance changes with either a comparison group of 
randomly selected SOEs or with a counterfactual expectation of what would have 
occurred if the privatised firms had remained state-owned.10  One illustration is the study 
by Frydman et al. (1999) who use survey data for Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 
1994. They use a fixed effects model to control for selection bias caused by unobserved 
firm characteristics correlated with performance outcomes that are fixed over time. Then 
they compare the performance of firms privatised in one period with those privatised in 
                                                 
9 Not all countries have favoured a privatisation process through FDI. In the case of Eastern and Central 
Europe for example Hungary was in this sense an exception, and it is exactly for this reason Mihályi (2000) 
argues that its transition towards a market economy has been more successful than most of other CEECs 
countries, since the divested firms can enter swiftly in the global trading system. 
10 See Galal et al. (1994), Newberry and Pollitt (1997), La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) 
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another for two time periods, in order to contrast the privatised firms with how they would 
have performed without privatisation. As a further control for selection bias, they compare 
the pre-privatisation performance of managerially-controlled firms with those of firms 
controlled by other owners.  
Rather than relying on such methods to deal with selection we use instead a 
combination of propensity score matching and difference-in-differences techniques, which 
to the best of our knowledge has never been used in studies on privatisations.11  We 
describe the details of this estimation approach in the following section.   
 
3 Data and methodology 
For our empirical analysis we draw on the Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise 
Statistics compiled by the State Statistical Bureau of China, covering all firms with annual 
turnover of over five million Renminbi (roughly $0.6 million).  The data set includes 
variables such as firm ownership structure, industry affiliation, establishment year, 
employment, gross output, value added, exports, fixed assets, and bank credit.12  The data 
available to us and used in this study cover the period 1999 to 2003.   
Broadly speaking Chinese firms are classified under four ownership categories: (i) 
state-owned (ii) privately-owned (iii) foreign-owned, and (iv) collectively-owned.  Since 
the focus of this paper is on isolating the employment effect of domestic privatisation and 
foreign acquisition of state-owned owned enterprises, collectively-owned firms and firms 
that remained in private or foreign hands during the entire sample period are dropped from 
our analysis.  Also firms with less than 3 observations are omitted given the need to have 
                                                 
11 The method has been employed by Girma (2005) in the context of identifying the employment effects of 
foreign acquisitions in the UK and we largely follow his approach in this paper.   
12 Nominal values are deflated using industry-specific ex-factory price indices obtained from China 
Statistical Yearbook 2004. 
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data during the pre and post ownership change period.  Thus our working sample consists 
of all firms with at least three time series observations and that have either remained in 
state ownership between 1999 and 2003 (the control group) or had started as state-owned 
enterprises and ended up in either domestic or foreign investors hands (the treatment 
group).  
As discussed above, the major problem in evaluating the effect of privatisation / 
acquisition is that the treatment is most likely not random.  Rather, certain types of firms 
may be selected as targets based on their pre-treatment characteristics.  There are, in 
general, a number of ways of dealing with this selectivity problem, using, e.g., 
instrumental variables regressions, difference-in-differences (DID) analysis, or propensity 
score matching.  All of these approaches rest on specific assumptions for the technique to 
be valid.  As argued by Blundell and Costa Dias (2000) a combination of matching and 
difference-in-differences analysis arguably improves the accuracy of an evaluation study 
and we follow this approach here.  Hence, instead of using a straightforward propensity 
score matching estimator we employ the more general difference-in-differences estimator 
on the sample of matched firms to isolate the effects of the treatment on employment 
growth of erstwhile state owned enterprises.  The specifics of the methodology within our 
context are outlined below. 
We employ the method of propensity score matching due to Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) to construct a sample of treated and control group firms.  The idea behind the 
propensity score matching method is to use of the probability of receiving treatment 
(foreign acquisition or domestic privatisation in the present context) as the basis for 
matching a treated firm to a control firm.  Accordingly, for each year, we first identify the 
probability of receiving treatment (or 'propensity score') via the following probit model  
),()1( 1 ititit DXFTREATP −==                                         (1) 
 9
where D is the full set of industry and regional dummies, and the vector X consists of 
debts, intangible assets, labour productivity, level and growth of employment in the pre-
treatment period.  These variables, thus, control of aspects of firm performance pre-
privatisation that are likely to make them attractive targets for privatisation – e.g., foreign 
investors may “cherry pick” plants with high productivity, high growth, low debts and 
high intensity of intangible assets prior to privatisation.   
For each firm i that has undergone ownership change, a state-owned firm j, which 
is ‘closest’ to it in terms of its propensity score is selected as a match using the ‘caliper’ 
matching method.13  The caliper method employs the nearest control firm whose 
propensity score falls within a pre-specified radius (which is set at 0.01 in our analysis) as 
a match for a treatment firm.  Furthermore we impose the so-called common support 
condition in the matching algorithm.  This involves dropping treatment firm observations 
whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the minimum propensity 
score of the control group of firms.14  We refer to the resulting sub-sample of matched 
firms as the matched sample.  Table 1 gives the frequency distribution of firms by year 
and treatment status for both the matched and unmatched sample. 
[Table 1 here] 
In order to estimate the impact of ownership change on employment growth in 
treated firms we adopt a differences-in-differences methodology on the matched sample.15  
The first step proceeds by comparing the average employment growth E&  before treatment 
with its post-treatment counterpart.  However, the resulting quantity, say, Ea &∆ , is a biased 
                                                 
13 The matching is performed in State Version 9 using the PSMATCH2 software provided by Leuven and 
Sianesi (2003).  Note that since lagged employment growth is included in the matching probit, matching was 
done for 2001, 2002 and 2003.   
14 We were also careful to check that the specification of the propensity score model ‘balances’ the pre-
treatment variables between the treatment and control groups conditional on the propensity score (e.g. 
Dehejia and Wahba, 2002).  Reassuringly we find from standard tests that the required balancing conditions 
are satisfied by the data.  The test results are reported in the appendix.   
15 See Meyer (1995) for an excellent exposition of this methodology. 
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estimator of the impact of the ownership change on employment growth since it is likely 
to be affected by other factors which are contemporaneous with the acquisition.  Now 
consider the changes in employment growth of the control plants corresponding to the pre 
and post acquisitions periods, say, Ec &∆ .  If exogenous shocks which are contemporaneous 
with the acquisitions affect the acquired and control firms in more or less similar fashions 
(arguably a reasonable assumption for the matched sample), the differences-in-differences 
estimator which is defined as  would purge the effects of common shocks 
and provide an unbiased estimator of the impact of ownership change.  
EE ca && ∆−∆=δ
To implement the above methodology within a regression framework, one can 
estimate the following equation, using the matched sample 
itiit AE εδα ++=&        (2) 
Here i and t index plants and time periods respectively and A is a vector of post-
treatment dummies.  In equation (2) the estimator for δ  yields the average percentage 
point change in the growth rate of employment that can be attributed to privatisation or 
foreign acquisition.  To allow for differential acquisition effects across the years, we 
construct two separate dummies, namely, a contemporaneous dummy and a second one 
for the period starting from one year after ownership change. 
In our empirical implementation, we extend the basic regression framework and 
embed it into an empirical labour demand model, following Girma (2005) and Girma and 
Görg (2004).  Hence, we control for wage growth and output growth as the main 
determinants of changes in labour demand in all regressions.16  Furthermore, a number of 
other plant characteristics are included to control for observable changes that are 
                                                 
16 Note that when controlling for output growth, the post-treatment dummies simply reflect the change in 
employment growth induced by changes in efficiency, i.e., the increase in the use of labour for a given level 
of output growth.   
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correlated with employment changes, namely age and the debt-to-asset (bank credit/total 
assets) ratio.  Numerous studies of firm dynamics (e.g. Geroski, 1995) have shown that 
younger firms tend to grow faster than older ones.  It is also well-documented that 
inefficient and near-bankrupt Chinese SOEs maintained their existence due to politically-
motivated easy access to bank credits and have been operating under soft budget 
constraints (e.g. Lin et al. 1998).  Finally, we include a full set of time, sectoral and 
regional dummies to capture aggregate shocks and permanent differences in the trend of 
employment growth across sectors and regions, respectively.   
We allow for different effects of the treatment on employment growth at different 
quantiles of the growth distribution.  This allows us to take better account of possible 
heterogeneity in employment growth and in the treatment effect across establishments.  
While standard least squares technique (OLS) estimates the mean of the dependent 
variable conditional on the covariates we use the quantile regression estimator to estimate 
the effect of the covariates on different quantiles of the employment growth distribution.   
The quantile regression technique was introduced by Koenker and Bassett 
(1978).17  Denoting the vector of regressors in the expanded version of equation (2) by Z, 
the quantile regression model can be written as 
( ) θθθθ βεβ itititititit ZZEQuantZE ′=+′= |, &&                     
where ( )itit ZEQuant |&θ  denotes the conditional quantile of .  The distribution of the 
error term 
itE&
θε  is left unspecified, so the estimation method is essentially semiparametric, 
and the θth quantile regression, 0 < θ < 1, solves 

⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ′−−+′−∑ ∑
′≥ ′<β ββ
βθβθ
zEti zEti
itititit ZEZEn & &
&&
:, :,
)1(1min          
                                                 
17 See Buchinsky (1998) for an excellent overview of quantile models. 
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Thus by increasing θ from 0 to 1, one can trace the entire distribution of SOEs 
employment growth, conditional on the set of regressors.  In this study we consider 
regression estimates at five different quantiles, namely, the 10th, 25th, 50th (median), 75th 
and 90th percentiles of the employment growth distribution. 
 
4 Empirical results 
By way of preliminary statistics, Table 2 presents average yearly growth rates of 
employment for the matched control group of purely state owned enterprises, SOEs that 
underwent a domestic privatisation and those that were acquired by foreign owners over 
the sample period.  For the latter two groups, we distinguish average growth pre and post 
the “treatment”.  We report the mean growth rate as well as five quantiles of the growth 
distribution.  Note, firstly, that the growth rate for pure SOEs is always lower than that for 
the treated firms pre-treatment, perhaps indicating that there is selection of privatisation 
and acquisition targets.  The mean employment growth declines after treatment for SOEs 
undergoing a domestic privatisation or a foreign acquisition.  This, however, is only true 
for firms undergoing a domestic privatisation when considering the lower quantiles of the 
growth distribution.  Examination of the 75th and 90th quantile shows that employment 
growth is higher after than before the privatisation.  Table 3 provides some further 
summary statistics on the variables included in the regression model for the full 
(unmatched) and matched (treated and untreated) sample.18   
[Tables 2 and 3 here] 
                                                 
18 Note that the matching and the appropriate balancing tests have been done on a year by year basis, while 
the summary statistics are calculated for the pooled sample.  Hence, we would not necessarily expect to see 
evidence for “balancing” in these pooled summary statistics between the matched treated and untreated 
firms.   
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The growth rates reported in Table 2 are, of course, only averages over fairly 
heterogeneous firms and, thus, hide the influence of other confounding effects.  In order to 
be able to determine the causal effect of ownership change on employment growth we, 
therefore, turn to the econometric analysis as described in Section 3.  In the first instance, 
we estimate a standard difference-in-differences approach (as in the “augmented” equation 
2) on the full sample of firms, i.e., including all SOEs that remained in state ownership 
over the period, as well as those SOEs that changed ownership (i.e., received treatment).  
Table 4 reports these econometric estimates based on the full sample.  
Reassuringly, wages and output growth, as well as age, have the expected signs 
across all quantiles and in the OLS (conditional mean) estimation.  We also find evidence 
that a higher debt-to-asset ratio has adverse effects on firms’ employment growth.  These 
effects appear more pronounced at the lower end of the employment growth distribution 
according to the quantile regression estimates.   
[Table 4 here] 
The quantile regressions also reveal substantial heterogeneity in the relationship 
between ownership change and the changes in labour demand of SOEs, indicating that the 
OLS estimates may not be provide a full description of the employment effects of 
domestic and foreign privatisations.  However, before interpreting the results we should 
note again that the simple DID estimates may be biased as they do, arguably not control 
properly for the selection effect in ownership change.  In order to deal with this we 
therefore estimate the DID model on the matched sample, where the sample has been 
constructed using the propensity score matching technique as described in Section 3.  The 
results of these estimations are reported in Table 5.   
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Note, firstly, that the coefficients on the control variables are largely similar to the 
results in Table 4, suggesting robustness of the coefficients.  The only difference with 
regard to the control concerns the debt variable, which is now only statistically significant 
in one specification (column 6).  Turning to the ownership change variables, a number of 
results are worth noting.   
For domestic privatisations we find a negative coefficient on the contemporaneous 
treatment dummy in the OLS regression.  This suggests that privatised firms have lower 
employment growth than firms that remained SOEs.19  As the quantile estimation 
indicates, however, this only holds for firms below the median of the employment growth 
distribution.  More specifically, the results suggest that the poorer the growth performance 
of the firm (i.e., the lower the quantile of the growth distribution), the more pronounced 
the negative effect.  For firms in the 10th percentile of the employment growth distribution, 
for example, growth is 27 percent lower in the privatisation year compared to non-treated 
firms.  This difference is only 12.9 percent for firms in the 25th percentile and 2.5 percent 
for the median firms.  The slower growth post-acquisition appears to be transitory, 
however, as the coefficient on the post privatisation dummy is statistically insignificant in 
all cases.   
By contrast, the results for foreign acquisitions appear to paint a slightly different 
picture of post-treatment labour demand effects.  There is evidence of a small (3 percent) 
negative and statistically significant effect on employment growth compared to non-
treated firms only for privatised firms at the median of the employment growth 
distribution  As with domestic privatisations, this negative effect appears to wear off 
quickly, however, as the coefficient on the post-acquisition dummy is statistically 
insignificant in this case.   
                                                 
19 It is worth pointing out that this does not imply that employment growth is negative for privatised firms, 
but only that growth is less relative to the base group of SOEs that remained state-owned.   
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From the regressions for the 75th and 90th quantile we find different results on the 
impact of foreign acquisitions.  More specifically, the results from these regressions show 
that during the after acquisition, newly foreign-owned firms exhibit faster employment 
growth than non-treated SOEs.  These positive effects suggest an average differential in 
the growth rate, compared to non-treated firms, of 5.5 percent for firms in the 75th quantile 
and 12.5 percent for firms in the 90th quantile of the growth distribution, respectively.  The 
coefficient turns statistically insignificant for firms at the bottom end of the quantiles.   
[Table 5 here] 
The differences in the coefficients obtained for the effect of domestic privatisation 
and foreign acquisitions for the different quantiles suggest that it seems prudent to analyse 
how sensitive the coefficients are to the choice of the respective quantile.  To investigate 
this issue we estimated the regressions at each quantile between 0.10 and 0.90 and plotted 
the coefficients for the two variables in Figures 1 and 2.  It is obvious that the coefficients 
for domestic privatisation do not seem to be overly sensitive to the choice of quantile, as 
they are generally increasing over the quantiles, as shown in Figure 1a (contemporaneous 
effect of privatisation), whilst Figure 1b shows clearly that around the 90th percentile there 
is a significant drop in the coefficient one year after the domestic privatisation event.  
There are some fluctuations also for the foreign acquisition variables but these do not 
appear to be so grave as to cause any major concerns for the estimation results.  
[Figures 1 and 2 here] 
  
5 Conclusions 
Only very few studies have dealt with the issue of nationality of ownership in 
evaluating the results of privatisation. This paper investigates the employment effects of 
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domestic privatisation or foreign acquisition of Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
within a simple labour demand framework.  We use a combination of propensity score 
matching and difference-in-differences in order to identify the causal effect of these types 
of ownership change on employment growth.  We furthermore allow for different effects 
of the “treatment” on firms at different quantiles of the employment growth distribution, 
using the quantile regression estimator in addition to standard OLS techniques.   
Our results suggest that, controlling for output growth, there is some evidence that 
domestic privatisation leads to lower employment growth compared to firms that did not 
undergo an ownership change.  This, perhaps, may be indicative of an almost 
instantaneous increase in efficiency of labour use following the ownership change, as, for 
a given level of output growth, growth in labour demand are less than it would have been 
had the firm not been privatised.  By contrast, there is some evidence that foreign 
acquisitions show higher employment growth in the post acquisition period than non-
acquired SOEs.  This should not be taken as evidence that the newly foreign owned firms 
are less efficient.  One possible alternative interpretation is that there is an increase in 
employment in an anticipation of increasing output, i.e., the firm is getting ready to 
prepare itself to grow in terms of output.  In order to verify or dismiss this conjecture a 
detailed investigation of output and productivity growth patterns would be necessary.  
While this is beyond the scope of this paper it is high on our future research agenda.   
Another possible explanation for these results could be given by the presence of 
specific agreements about the workforce levels between the foreign acquirers and the local 
government authority selling the SOEs.  While there is no national law in China which 
constrains foreigners in this sense, we cannot observe the presence of idiosyncratic 
agreements or exceptions to the general rule made by local authorities.  If such binding 
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contracts were important, however, then this should manifest itself immediately, rather 
than in the long run after the privatisation.  
Furthermore, our findings of zero or positive employment growth effects of 
foreign acquisitions may also be due to possible technology transfer accompanying the 
foreign investment (e.g., Girma et al., 2006).  If the new technology also necessitates the 
use of more skilled labour due to the introduction of more sophisticated production 
methods, this could counteract the negative effect on labour demand for less skilled 
workers.  The two opposing effects on employment obviously might drive the 
insignificance of those coefficients.  However, in order to be able to come to firmer 
conclusions on this, further research is necessary to investigate labour demand for 
different types of workers over longer time horizons.   
Finally, our results are in line with those in Frydman et al. (1999), who find that 
privatisation to foreign owners leads to significantly fewer layoffs as compared with state 
firms, and their result holds controlling for revenue and productivity growth. This 
evidence should dissipate some fears that privatisation to foreign owners might bring 
about larger unemployment effects given the assumption that private owners are more 
aggressive in restructuring the over-manned post-communist enterprises. 
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Table 1 
Frequency of domestic privatisation and foreign acquisitions 
 
 Whole sample  Matched sample 
 Domestic Foreign Control Domestic Foreign Control 
2000 15 15 16707    
2001 158 39 18461 128 33 153 
2002 138 20 15313 94 15 105 
2003 323 30 12206 305 30 316 
Total 707 104 n/a 527 78 574 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Employment growth quantiles for matched sample 
 
 Control Group Domestic Privatised Foreign  acquisition 
   Before after before after 
q=.1 -0.432 -0.405 -0.700 -0.292 -0.381 
q=.25 -0.137 -0.112 -0.246 -0.092 -0.133 
q=.50 -0.014 0.000 -0.033 0.000 0.000 
q=.75 0.000 0.014 0.027 0.081 0.078 
q=.90 0.122 0.204 0.247 0.346 0.245 
mean -0.090 -0.033 -0.125 0.015 -0.032 
Std.Dev. 0.501 0.515 0.569 0.470 0.377 
Observations 1994 1064 848 140 151 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Summary statistics 
 
  
Full sample (unmatched 
untreated) Matched untreated Matched treated 
Variables Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev 
Wage growth 0.071 0.763 0.069 0.756 0.084 0.769 
Output growth -0.054 0.743 -0.006 0.692 0.064 0.633 
log debt -0.647 0.763 -0.609 0.684 -0.656 0.701 
log employment 4.973 1.493 5.192 1.405 5.196 1.108 
Intangible assets/total assets 0.0182 0.069 0.02 0.076 0.029 0.083 
Labour productivity (log value 
added per worker) 2.622 1.390 3.398 1.296 3.497 1.151 
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Table 4 
OLS and Quantile regression estimates, full sample 
 
  
       
 OLS q=.1 q=.25 q=.5 q=.75 q=.9 
Wage growth -0.369 -0.327 -0.250 -0.124 -0.107 -0.219 
 (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.006)*** 
Output growth 0.148 0.178 0.119 0.052 0.038 0.076 
 (0.005)*** (0.008)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.005)*** 
Age -0.030 -0.018 -0.018 -0.014 -0.022 -0.065 
 (0.002)*** (0.005)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.004)*** 
Debt -0.018 -0.036 -0.019 -0.007 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.002)*** (0.006)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.004) 
Domestic 
privatisation  
contemporaneous 
-0.053 -0.164 -0.098 -0.014 0.001 0.016 
 (0.021)** (0.035)*** (0.014)*** (0.005)*** (0.005) (0.024) 
Domestic 
privatisation post  
0.023 0.037 0.013 0.008 0.010 0.010 
 (0.010)** (0.022)* (0.009) (0.003)** (0.003)*** (0.016) 
Foreign 
acquisition 
contemporaneous 
0.013 0.007 -0.014 -0.017 0.003 -0.008 
 (0.038) (0.089) (0.034) (0.013) (0.014) (0.062) 
Foreign 
acquisition post 
0.079 0.160 0.040 0.018 0.048 0.019 
 (0.020)*** (0.055)*** (0.021)* (0.008)** (0.009)*** (0.039) 
Constant 0.004 -0.463 -0.154 0.001 0.104 0.426 
 (0.011) (0.026)*** (0.010)*** (0.004) (0.004)*** (0.018)*** 
Observations 59214 59214 59214 59214 59214 59214 
R-squared 0.31      
 
Notes: 
a. Robust standard errors in parentheses       
b. significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
c. all specifications include the full set of time, industry and regional dummies   
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Table 5 
OLS and Quantile regression estimates; based on sample of propensity score 
matched firms 
 
     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLS q=.1 q=.25 q=.5 q=.75 q=.9 
Wage growth -0.298 -0.236 -0.163 -0.087 -0.097 -0.183 
 (0.036)*** (0.033)*** (0.012)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.016)*** 
Output growth 0.144 0.144 0.107 0.056 0.055 0.094 
 (0.022)*** (0.038)*** (0.014)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.014)*** 
Age -0.031 -0.004 -0.018 -0.017 -0.032 -0.107 
 (0.009)*** (0.021) (0.010)* (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.010)*** 
Debt -0.005 0.005 0.007 0.002 -0.002 -0.031 
 (0.011) (0.023) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010)*** 
Domestic 
privatisation 
contemporaneous 
-0.080 -0.270 -0.129 -0.025 -0.010 0.034 
 (0.027)*** (0.046)*** (0.024)*** (0.006)*** (0.008) (0.022) 
Domestic 
privatisation post 
-0.031 -0.064 -0.043 -0.006 -0.001 0.012 
 (0.026) (0.057) (0.029) (0.008) (0.010) (0.028) 
Foreign acquisition 
contemporaneous 
-0.004 -0.111 -0.018 -0.030 -0.022 0.125 
 (0.050) (0.105) (0.053) (0.015)** (0.018) (0.047)*** 
Foreign acquisition 
post 
0.080 0.073 0.033 0.022 0.055 -0.022 
 (0.031)*** (0.101) (0.055) (0.015) (0.019)*** (0.052) 
Constant 0.086 -0.273 -0.105 0.026 0.146 0.485 
 (0.041)** (0.167) (0.094) (0.026) (0.030)*** (0.084)*** 
Observations 4022 4022 4022 4022 4022 4022 
R-squared 0.23      
 
Notes: 
a. Robust standard errors in parentheses       
b. significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
All specifications include the full set of time, industry and regional dummies 
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Figure 1: The effect of domestic privatisation on employment growth: 
Point estimates and 95% confidence interval across all quantiles 
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 Figure 2: The effect of foreign acquisition   on employment growth:  
Point estimates and 95% confidence interval across all quantiles  
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Appendix: Results of balancing tests 
 
The first balancing test examines the standardised difference (or bias) for all 
variables in X (that is the vector of covariates used in the propensity score estimation) as 
described in Smith and Todd (2005).  For example, the standardised bias for the 
employment level (size) variable is defined as the difference in means between the foreign 
acquired sample of firms (group A) and the appropriately matched comparison group of 
firms (group C) scaled by the average variances of the variable in groups A and C.  Based 
on N acquired firm this is given as  
2
)()(
),(1100
)(
sizeVarsizeVar
sizeppgsize
N
sizeSDIFF
CjAi
Ai Cj
jjii
∈∈
∈ ∈
+
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⎡ −
=
∑ ∑
 .       
Note that the lower the standardised difference, the more balanced or similar the 
treatment and comparison groups will be in terms of the variable under consideration.  
Although there is no formal criterion as to how large a standardised bias should be for it to 
be considered serious, we follow Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) and assume that a value of 
20 is large.  Furthermore, for each variable entering the propensity score model we 
perform a formal paired t-test between acquired and matched comparison to satisfy 
ourselves that no significant differences exist.  The results of these two tests are reported 
in the tables below for the matching done for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003.   
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Table A1: Balancing tests for matching for 2001 
 
                          |       Mean               %reduct |     t-test 
    Variable     Sample   | Treated Control    %bias  |bias| |    t    p>|t| 
   L1_liquid  Unmatched   | -.5799  -.61585      5.6         |   0.64  0.519 
                Matched   | -.5799  -.67496     14.8  -164.4 |   1.31  0.190 
                          |                                  | 
   L1_intass  Unmatched   | .02947   .01628     17.5         |   2.63  0.009 
                Matched   | .02947   .02826      1.6    90.8 |   0.12  0.903 
                          |                                  | 
   L1_Dlnemp  Unmatched   |-.05446  -.05071     -0.9         |  -0.09  0.927 
                Matched   |-.05446   -.0148     -9.8  -957.2 |  -0.70  0.483 
                          |                                  | 
    L1_lnemp  Unmatched   | 5.2928   5.1426     11.6         |   1.29  0.199 
                Matched   | 5.2928   5.3004     -0.6    94.9 |  -0.05  0.960 
                          |                                  | 
   L1_lnprod  Unmatched   | 2.9894   2.5108     37.4         |   4.50  0.000 
                Matched   | 2.9894   3.0274     -3.0    92.1 |  -0.29  0.774 
                          |                                  | 
 
 
Table A2: Balancing tests for matching for 2002 
 
                          |       Mean               %reduct |     t-test 
    Variable     Sample   | Treated Control    %bias  |bias| |    t    p>|t| 
    
   L1_liquid  Unmatched   |-.53703  -.65479     16.1         |   1.71  0.087 
                Matched   |-.53703  -.57361      5.0    68.9 |   0.40  0.690 
                          |                                  | 
   L1_intass  Unmatched   | .02542   .01913      9.6         |   0.96  0.338 
                Matched   | .02542   .03495    -14.5   -51.2 |  -0.88  0.379 
                          |                                  | 
   L1_Dlnemp  Unmatched   |-.07944  -.12378      9.4         |   0.87  0.387 
                Matched   |-.07944  -.07012     -2.0    79.0 |  -0.17  0.864 
                          |                                  | 
    L1_lnemp  Unmatched   | 5.1482   5.0536      7.3         |   0.68  0.493 
                Matched   | 5.1482   5.3528    -15.8  -116.4 |  -1.18  0.238 
                          |                                  | 
   L1_lnprod  Unmatched   | 3.1974   2.6969     42.7         |   4.20  0.000 
                Matched   | 3.1974    3.127      6.0    85.9 |   0.51  0.613 
                          |                                  | 
 
 
Table A3: Balancing tests for matching for 2003 
 
                          |       Mean               %reduct |     t-test 
    Variable     Sample   | Treated Control    %bias  |bias| |    t    p>|t| 
 
   L1_liquid  Unmatched   | -.6843  -.66197     -2.9         |  -0.53  0.594 
                Matched   | -.6843  -.68178     -0.3    88.7 |  -0.04  0.968 
                          |                                  | 
   L1_intass  Unmatched   |   .025   .01967      7.2         |   1.35  0.177 
                Matched   |   .025   .02628     -1.7    76.0 |  -0.22  0.824 
                          |                                  | 
   L1_Dlnemp  Unmatched   |-.03039  -.06874      9.2         |   1.62  0.105 
                Matched   |-.03039  -.02225     -2.0    78.8 |  -0.28  0.780 
                          |                                  | 
    L1_lnemp  Unmatched   | 5.2273    5.091     10.9         |   1.70  0.088 
                Matched   | 5.2273   5.1832      3.5    67.6 |   0.43  0.667 
                          |                                  | 
   L1_lnprod  Unmatched   | 3.2066    2.846     29.6         |   4.96  0.000 
                Matched   | 3.2066   3.2419     -2.9    90.2 |  -0.39  0.699 
                          |                                  | 
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